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GARY LAWSON & DAVID B . K OPEL
Bad News for John Marshall
In Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality 
of the Individual Mandate, we demonstrated that the individual mandate’s forced 
participation in commercial transactions cannot be justified under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the Clause was interpreted in McCulloch v. Maryland. Professor 
Andrew Koppelman’s response, Bad News for Everybody, wrongly conflates that 
argument with a wide range of interpretative and substantive positions that are not 
logically entailed by taking seriously the requirement that laws enacted under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause must be incidental to an enumerated power. His 
response is thus largely unresponsive to our actual arguments.
introduction
So Chief Justice John Marshall was really a city-torching,1 pollution-
loving,2 law-hating,3 killing machine?4 Who knew?
Such is the upshot of Professor Andrew Koppelman’s hyperbolic reaction 
to our recent essay5 explaining that the individual mandate in the Patient 
1. Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Everybody: Lawson and Kopel on Health Care Reform and 
Originalism, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 515, 517 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/03/13/
koppelman.html.
2. Id. at 519.
3. Id. at 522.
4. Id. at 522-23.
5. Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental 
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011), http://
yalelawjournal.org/2011/11/08/lawson&kopel.html.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2586276 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)6 is not constitutionally 
authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause.7 We showed that the original 
meaning of the Clause authorizes the exercise only of powers that are 
“incidental” to an enumerated power. The power to compel private parties to 
purchase products from other private parties cannot be incidental to the power 
to regulate interstate commerce. In other words, the power to compel 
involuntary commerce is at least as great (or as “dignified” or as “worthy”) as 
the power to regulate voluntary interstate commerce.8
Second, we showed that the mandate’s establishment of a privileged 
oligopoly of health insurance companies with whom people are forced to 
transact is not “proper” because it violates the fiduciary norms embodied in the 
Clause. Government-created monopolies are the paradigm of an “improper”
law under the original meaning of the Clause; a fortiori, compelling commerce 
with a government-created oligopoly is improper.9
The first point tracks precisely the analysis offered by Chief Justice 
Marshall (and all of the Justices who unanimously joined his opinion) in 
McCulloch v. Maryland.10 The case recognized that the incidental nature of the 
power of incorporation had to be established before one determined if an 
incorporated national bank was “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution”11 federal powers. If, as Professor Koppelman appears to believe, 
only reprobates intent upon ending civilization, crashing the world financial 
order, and randomly killing off the populace could advance our arguments, a 
new biography of John Marshall is clearly warranted.
Looking past the ad homines and conspiracy theories that densely populate 
Professor Koppelman’s work, Professor Koppelman does not actually dispute 
our scholarly claims about the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. Since those were the only claims that we were making, we could 
perfectly well declare victory and go home. By the same token, Professor 
Koppelman correctly notes that we did not devote much attention to 
challenging his claims about the Commerce Clause, the Taxing Clause, or the 
specific reasoning employed by the various federal courts that have found the 
6. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified primarily in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
8. Lawson & Kopel, supra note 5, at 272-77, 279-84.
9. Id. at 287-91.
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see Lawson & Kopel, supra note 5, at 277-79.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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mandate unconstitutional.12 Accordingly, he could very well have declared 
victory on that basis and gone home. Indeed, had he stopped his most recent 
essay after its first paragraph, we would all be on to other projects by now.
But no. In the course of casting our essay as the eighth sign of the 
apocalypse, Professor Koppelman commits a number of profound scholarly 
mistakes that merit correction, so here we are one more time.
Professor Koppelman’s argument amounts to the following sequence of 
propositions: (1) people have not talked about principals and incidents in 
connection with the Necessary and Proper Clause for a long time and so it is 
therefore inappropriate to do so now; (2) if one accepts the notion that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause includes the doctrine of principals and incidents, 
and thus only grants Congress incidental powers, one must also accept all 
tenets of Professor Lawson’s particular version of originalism; (3) the doctrine 
of principals and incidents leads to various constitutional outcomes that 
Koppelman finds, and that many readers will likely find, unappealing; and (4) 
if those constitutional outcomes were applied as grounds for decision in cases, 
really bad real-world consequences would follow. Each proposition embodies 
its own set of serious scholarly missteps, on which we offer some very brief 
thoughts seriatim.
i . out with the old .  .  .  and also out with the new .  .  .
and also out with pretty much everything else that 
professor koppelman does not like
Professor Koppelman seems almost offended that we would remind 
modern readers of the premises underlying McCulloch v. Maryland.13 Modern 
courts do not talk that way. How dare we suggest that they consider doing so!
12. That is not because we agreed with his claims, no more than Professor Koppelman must be 
held to agree with everything we wrote that he did not specifically contest. Perhaps the day 
will come when scholars will send each other interrogatories or requests for admissions, but 
we are not there yet. Except in footnotes, we did not address issues beyond the Necessary 
and Proper Clause because (a) The Yale Law Journal Online has word limits, and (b) we 
thought we had fresher and more interesting insights to offer on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.
13. Koppelman, supra note 1, at 516 (“Bad News for Professor Koppelman is . . . the first piece of 
modern scholarship that has ever proposed that these eighteenth-century norms become the 
master concepts for determining the scope of congressional power today.”); id. at 516-17
(“[I]t seems harsh to reproach me for not taking the limits they offer into account in my 
own consideration of congressional power. How could I have known?”). We are by no 
means the first modern scholars to propose application of the doctrine of principals and 
incidents. In fact, we borrowed the idea from Robert Natelson, who has been tirelessly 
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The ultraconservatism and anti-intellectualism of this response is startling 
to see in a scholarly journal. Professor Koppelman seems to believe that 
whatever forms of discourse exist at a particular moment in time are the only 
forms of discourse that responsible scholars or litigants can permissibly 
employ. Is no one ever to suggest a different or new or old way to think about 
problems? Do the concepts that appear in the current pages of the federal 
reporter system represent the final and ultimate stage in legal evolution? Of 
course not. Changing the forms of discourses, including reviving previously 
employed discourses, is a routine part of the real-world process of law.14
Moreover, the common law method that underlies Professor Koppelman’s 
multimodal form of interpretation frequently (one might even say essentially) 
involves drawing out, articulating, and applying what is implicit or immanent 
in prior decisions or discussions.
The doctrine of principals and incidents has never been rejected. Until the 
unprecedented usurpation of power by the individual mandate, there were no 
obvious modern occasions to invoke it. That does not mean that it is not a 
correct understanding of the Constitution, and it does not mean that people 
interested in the correct understanding of the Constitution should not employ 
it.
ii . being gary lawson
Professor Koppelman appears to believe that acceptance of the doctrine of 
principals and incidents entails acceptance of a sweeping theory of 
constitutionalism exemplified by Professor Lawson’s corpus of academic 
researching such issues for years. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004).
Besides, if the doctrine of principals and incidents is a novelty to many law professors, it 
has never been so to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has used the doctrine in many 
different contexts, in dozens of cases, of which the most famous recent one is Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). See Brief of Authors of The Origins of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause (Gary Lawson, Robert G. Natelson & Guy Seidman) and the Independence 
Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents (Minimum Coverage Provision), at 19
& n.10, 25-28 & nn.14-23, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. 
Feb. 13, 2012).
14. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (transforming the discourse 
concerning the Confrontation Clause, based largely on scholarly work regarding the 
Clause’s original meaning); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (arguing that 
constitutional discourse is always changing and that original meaning should always be an 
important part of constitutional discourse).
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writings. This claim is silly on its face.15 John Marshall, for one, accepted our 
argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants only incidental powers16
(or, more precisely, we accepted John Marshall’s argument), yet John Marshall 
did not agree with, inter alia, Professor Lawson’s theory of precedent17 or his 
theories about the power of Congress to allocate jurisdiction among federal 
courts.18 Was John Marshall foolish or logically inconsistent? Is Professor 
Lawson’s constitutional theory so powerful and so obviously correct that to dip 
one’s toe into any aspect of originalism is to be irrevocably and tragically
sucked into the Lawsonian vortex?
Professor Lawson is flattered that Professor Koppelman would so intimate, 
but modesty compels him to admit that it is possible to endorse some facets of 
his positions while rejecting others without committing a plain logical fallacy.19
In particular, the argument that we advanced in Bad News for Professor 
Koppelman was not a purely Lawson argument. Initially, there’s the empirical 
fact that it was a Lawson-Kopel argument (and indeed one that was largely 
inspired by insights from Rob Natelson, Guy Seidman, and Geoffrey Miller). 
Moreover, a person could believe, for example, that precedent operates either 
as some part of original meaning or as some kind of side constraint upon it and 
could still agree with us about both the general doctrine of principals and 
incidents and the specific application of that doctrine to the individual 
15. If Professor Koppelman does not mean to assert this claim, it becomes very difficult to 
imagine why he spends so much time describing work by Professor Lawson that has little or 
nothing to do with the present argument.
16. We also believe that John Marshall would have endorsed our specific application of the 
doctrine of principals and incidents to the individual mandate, but to justify that belief 
would require a separate article. Fortunately, Professor Kopel and Robert Natelson have 
already written it. Robert G. Natelson & David B. Kopel, “Health Laws of Every Description”: 
John Marshall’s Ruling on a Federal Health Care Law, 12 ENGAGE 49 (2011), available at http://
www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20110603_NatelsonKopelEngage12.1.pdf.
17. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-02 (1819) (invoking legislative 
and executive precedent as a grounds for upholding the constitutionality of the Bank of the 
United States), with Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent 
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing that precedent is almost never a valid 
source of constitutional meaning).
18. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-76 (1803) (holding that Congress 
cannot expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction), with Steven G. Calabresi & Gary 
Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist 
Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1037-42 (2007) (arguing that it can).
19. To be clear: Professor Lawson thinks that he is right about most of what he says (he 
occasionally offers up a few tentative ideas about which he is not sure in order to stimulate 
thought), but to get to many of his positions requires chains of reasoning that go far beyond 
the simple insight that the Necessary and Proper Clause embodies the doctrine of principals 
and incidents.
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mandate. (The precedent-bound person would know that the doctrine of 
principals and incidents has never been rejected and that nothing relevantly 
like the individual mandate has ever been upheld.) A person could also believe 
that broader or more general conclusions regarding federal power—those one 
might reach by undiluted application of Lawsonian original meaning—are 
interpretatively foreclosed by any of the various modalities of which Professor 
Koppelman is so fond, if those modalities are part of that person’s own 
interpretative framework.
Our argument represents an overlapping consensus among a wide range of 
theories that employ some version of originalism, and most of those theories 
do not compel Lawsonian purity. If Professor Koppelman wants to describe the 
interpretative consequences of adopting the doctrine of principals and 
incidents, he needs to describe the interpretative consequences of adopting the 
doctrine of principals and incidents, not the interpretative consequences of 
being Gary Lawson.20 So we now turn to the doctrine itself.
iii . burning down the house?
For someone who decries the uncertainty and indeterminacy surrounding 
the doctrine of principals and incidents as it applies to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause,21 Professor Koppelman is remarkably confident that use of such 
a doctrine would “blow up large parts of the U.S. Code.”22 He sees the 
imminent demise of federal immigration law, pollution control law, intrastate 
20. As to whether Professor Koppelman has accurately described the interpretative 
consequences of being Gary Lawson, Professor Lawson would have to write a separate 
article to address the subject point by point—it is a mixed bag. Professor Koppelman surely 
comes close enough to shock and horrify the people that he was trying to shock and horrify. 
Professor Lawson is cheerfully capable of being shocking and horrifying. He is also, 
however, cheerfully capable of being blandly conventional. He has written five editions of an 
unremittingly doctrinal administrative law casebook, teaches unremittingly doctrinal 
courses, and has a corpus of unremittingly doctrinal scholarship to go along with his edgier 
work. He frequently coauthors work with folks decidedly to the left (not just to his left, 
which is pretty much everyone, but to the country’s left). His article with Kopel (a lifelong 
registered Democrat) sits comfortably within a zone of overlapping consensus among a wide 
range of persons who take the meaning of the Constitution seriously.
21. See Koppelman, supra note 1, at 518-19. We cannot resist juxtaposing this passage with 
footnote 65 of the same essay, which celebrates the rampant indeterminacy of Professor 
Koppelman’s favored multimodal interpretative approach. Id. at 524 n.65.
22. Id. at 522.
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railroad rate regulation, antidiscrimination law, food and drug law, securities 
law, and banking law.23
Professor Koppelman’s central methodological error is plain: he is using 
the doctrine of principals and incidents as a stand-in for every conceivable 
argument that any person of any conceivable interpretative persuasion could 
make against any conceivable exercise of federal power. This is the same error 
that some people used to make about Lochner v. New York.24 Lochner was a case 
about whether the Fourteenth Amendment limited a state’s abilities to set 
maximum hours laws, absent sufficient evidence that the maximum hours law 
protected health and safety. Whether or not Lochner was correctly decided,25
the decision had nothing to do with doctrines such as the delegation of 
lawmaking power to an administrative agency, the scope of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, the scope of the federal taxing power, the scope of the 
federal spending power, and so on. Yet “Lochner” was used as an epithet to 
attack any decision that ruled against anything that the early twentieth-century 
Progressives wanted to do.
Similarly, Professor Koppelman’s litany involves an enormous and diverse 
set of federal laws. Perhaps there are textualist or originalist arguments that 
could be made that would call some of them into question.26 But would 
following McCulloch v. Maryland27—that is, would applying the doctrine of 
principals and incidents—kill every one of those laws? Professor Koppelman is 
confident that the answer is “yes.” We are not so sure. In our essay, we 
provided a detailed examination of how the doctrine of principals and incidents 
applies to the individual health insurance mandate. We encourage scholars to 
examine the constitutionality of all federal laws, including the ones listed by 
Professor Koppelman, through the same lens, but we doubt that such analysis 
would eliminate all the ones in his list.
For example, federal water pollution regulation is straightforwardly derived 
from the federal power to regulate the waters of the United States, which in 
turn flows (no pun intended) from the fact that the channels of navigation can 
23. See id. at 519-20.
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. For whatever it is worth, the arch-anarchist Professor Lawson thinks that it was wrongly 
decided.
26. Professor Lawson, for example, has specifically criticized at least some of those laws on 
nondelegation grounds. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327, 379-81 (2002).
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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be regulated under the Commerce Clause.28 No strong inference from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is necessary. Regulating intrastate rail rates to 
prohibit discriminatory pricing between interstate and intrastate markets is 
easily incidental to the power to regulate interstate rates. And if, by some 
chance, any of the laws that Professor Koppelman believes (perhaps correctly) 
are so essential to civilized life that their absence is unthinkable are in fact 
unconstitutional, we are confident that the overwhelming public support for 
Professor Koppelman’s position will easily allow corrective amendments—
which is precisely how the Constitution itself contemplates adjustment to 
changing circumstances.29 The Constitution has been amended six times to 
give Congress new powers to address civil rights problems.30 When Professor 
Koppelman’s Progressive ancestors convinced the public that Congress needed 
new power to address an important national problem, the Eighteenth 
Amendment was ratified in under thirteen months.31 The Constitution simply 
requires that, when Congress wishes to exercise a power that was not granted 
by the Constitution, Congress ask for and receive a new grant of power from 
the American people. Congress cannot usurp new powers for itself simply 
because a bare majority of Congress and some law professor enablers think that 
the novel power would be beneficial.
With respect to mail robbers, the power to punish violations of federal law
and to create offices and appropriate funds for enforcement32 is comfortably 
incident to a governmental power to pass laws. This is why the Necessary and 
Proper Clause can authorize the prescription of penalties, the creation of 
offices, and the appropriation of funds for enforcement. As Chief Justice 
Marshall explained, “the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and 
may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his 
constitutional powers.”33 The punishment of mail robbers does not raise an 
issue about the conceptual scope of incidental power—which is why Chief 
Justice Marshall discussed mail robbery in the context of rejecting Maryland’s 
28. See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006).
29. See U.S. CONST. art. V (explaining how to amend the Constitution).
30. Id. amends. XIII-XV, XIX, XXIV & XXVI. Each of these amendments includes a clause 
giving Congress the power to enforce the amendments by appropriate legislation.
31. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 919, 924 n.26 (1979).
32. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417-18.
33. Id. at 418.
bad news for john marshall
537
claim that “necessary” meant “indispensably necessary,”34 and why Marshall 
did not discuss mail robbery in the context of rejecting Maryland’s claim that 
chartering a corporation could not be an incident.
We get the sense that Professor Koppelman simply does not understand 
the difference between an argument that something is not even theoretically an 
incident and an argument that something is not incidental in a particular 
context because it is not “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”35 a 
principal power. A full assessment of whether a law is authorized by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause requires four distinct inquiries: (1) is the claimed 
power even potentially an incident; (2) if potentially an incident, does the 
claimed power “carry[] into Execution” some other federal power; (3) if 
potentially an incident, is the claimed power “necessary” for carrying some 
power into execution and thus included among the incidental powers actually 
granted by this particular agency instrument; and (4) if potentially an incident 
and necessary, is exercise of the claimed power “proper” for executing federal 
power? The individual mandate flunks the first inquiry. The other laws 
identified by Professor Koppelman do not (or at least Professor Koppelman has 
not constructed a persuasive argument that they do).
The Koppelman parade of horribles also rests on a misunderstanding of 
how the doctrine of principals and incidents applies to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. As we detailed in our essay, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
definitely does not authorize Congress to compel involuntary commerce among 
private parties. (The power to compel involuntary commerce is not an incident 
of, and is not “less worthy” than, the power to regulate voluntary interstate 
commerce.36) Fortunately, it was not until 2010 that Congress ever claimed 
that it had such a power. So the recognition that Congress cannot compel 
commerce does not cast doubt on any federal statute, other than the PPACA 
itself. However, Congress can, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
sometimes regulate voluntary intrastate commerce. That is because the power 
to regulate voluntary intrastate commerce can indeed be an incident (a “lesser”
power) of the enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. 
Conceptually, the doctrine of principals and incidents allows the regulation of 
intrastate commerce and forbids a mandate to engage in involuntary 
34. Id. at 417. For whatever it is worth, the arch-anarchist Professor Lawson agrees with Chief 
Justice Marshall on this point: Maryland and Thomas Jefferson were wrong to think that 
the word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause means “indispensable.” See Gary 
Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 246 (2005).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
36. Lawson & Kopel, supra note 5, at 277-79.
the yale law journal online 121:529 2012
538
commerce. The constitutionality of a particular federal law premised on the 
interstate commerce power, and using the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
reach intrastate commerce, depends on the characteristics of the law that 
determines whether it is “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”37
some federal power. All we can say for certain is that if there is a constitutional 
problem with such a law, the problem is not that the law’s regulation of 
intrastate commerce is a violation of the doctrine of principals and incidents.
As McCulloch demonstrates, the scope of the constraint imposed by the 
doctrine of principals and incidents is quite narrow. Indeed, perhaps one of the 
reasons why modern cases have not discussed it is because, until the mandate, 
there was no occasion to do so. If Professor Koppelman wishes to make a 
detailed argument that some particular federal law violates the doctrine of 
principals and incidents, we would welcome his analysis. For the time being at 
least, we are skeptical that each and every law on his list must vanish simply 
from treating McCulloch v. Maryland as binding precedent.
It is interesting to see how often the advocates of the individual mandate, 
including Professor Koppelman, keep insisting that, if the Supreme Court 
strikes down a single, novel, and utterly unprecedented congressional 
usurpation of power, then more than a century’s worth of federal laws on other 
subjects will come crashing down with it.38 While one of us, as Professor 
Koppelman notes, would be quite pleased to dispense with much of that 
century’s work product,39 the doctrine of principals and incidents will not do 
the trick. It is not even close.40
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
38. Koppelman, supra note 1, at 519-20.
39. Id. at 522-23.
40. Neither will the fiduciary principle of equal treatment implicit in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. Mandating purchases from government-favored oligopolists is obviously 
unconstitutional under the fiduciary principle, but the principle’s scope beyond that setting 
is not dramatically beyond the scope of current Equal Protection doctrine, which we assume 
Professor Koppelman does not regard as “anarchical.” Id. at 521 n.48. As for all federal laws 
therefore being “presumptively . . . unconstitutional,” id. at 521, this would be true only in a 
very limited sense: it is an obvious consequence, not of anything peculiar to our 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause (or any other clause), but of the whole 
idea of a government of enumerated powers. He who asserts must prove, and anyone who 
asserts the existence of a federal power therefore has to prove it. Professor Koppelman may 
be uncomfortable with the idea of a less-than-omnipotent government, but that is no reason 
to cast aside basic principles of epistemology.
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iv.  the c onstitution prevails over policy assertions
As freely as Professor Koppelman predicts the doctrinal consequences of 
theories that he professes to find baffling and unfamiliar, he even more freely 
predicts the real-world consequences of legal doctrines and policy positions, 
boldly pronouncing on complex social phenomena whose intelligent analysis 
requires expertise in a dizzying range of fields. To eliminate federal regulation, 
he declares, is to “devastate the lives of millions of people, turning American 
life into a nightmare of pollution, consumer fraud, contaminated food and 
drink, and rampant racial discrimination.”41 At other points in this exchange, 
Professor Koppelman makes confident pronouncements about the real world 
consequences of monetary policy,42 fiscal policy,43 and even the wide range of 
scientific disciplines (chemistry, biology, physics, oceanography, meteorology, 
nephology, botany, statistics, etc.) necessary to make credible statements about 
global climate trends.44 We know that Northwestern University School of Law 
values interdisciplinary work, but we were not aware that, in Professor 
Koppelman, they had a veritable Da Vinci in their midst.
Of course law professors, like other people, are entitled to have and express 
opinions on matters about which they have no particular qualifications to 
opine. But Professor Koppelman does more than simply opine: he proclaims, 
with the kind of arrogance that suggests that anyone who thinks otherwise on 
these weighty matters is foolish or deluded. At the risk of grave error, we 
frankly doubt whether Professor Koppelman knows enough about any of these 
topics to qualify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 70245 (even if, by 
some chance, he happens to be right about some of them). We would probably 
not qualify either. Accordingly, we will not consume space in a scholarly legal 
journal to exchange amateur opinions about whether the fate of civilization 
depends upon meekly accepting the most extravagant modern extrapolations of 
cases from seven or eight decades ago, cases that belong to a short period when 
the Court was more supine to the other federal branches than it ever was before 
or ever has been since then; about whether states are incompetent to deal with 
41. Id. at 522.
42. Id. at 522-23.
43. Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health 
Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 23 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/
koppelman.html.
44. Koppelman, supra note 1, at 522-23; Koppelman, supra note 43, at 23.
45. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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health care issues46 or pollution;47 about whether states are incapable of 
passing laws against contaminated food or consumer fraud; or about whether 
the labor laws of the New Deal were racially regressive.48 We prefer to stick to a 
subject about which we can plausibly claim professional expertise: ascertaining 
the meaning of the Constitution. And the meaning of the Constitution with 
respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause and the individual mandate is clear.
Gary Lawson is Professor of Law and Michaels Faculty Research Scholar at 
Boston University School of Law. David B. Kopel is Research Director at the 
Independence Institute, an Associate Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, and an 
Adjunct Professor of Advanced Constitutional Law at Denver University, Sturm 
College of Law. David Kopel would like to thank his father, Jerry Kopel, who served 
twenty-two years in the Colorado House of Representatives, and who, as one of the 
most liberal Democrats in the legislature, always affirmed the principle that obeying 
the Constitution is more important than advancing any policy agenda.
Preferred citation: Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for John 
Marshall, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 529 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/
2012/03/06/lawson&kopel.html.
46. The states seem to think themselves competent; twenty-seven of them are suing to have the 
PPACA declared unconstitutional.
47. Professor Kopel spent four years as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Colorado 
helping to enforce antipollution laws.
48. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR 
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2000).
